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Discussion After the Speeches of John Ellicott
and Jonathan T. Fried

QUESTION, Professor King: In terms of the effect of economic
sanctions, particularly in the political area, do export controls achieve
the objectives that they seek out? For example, you have the situation of
Libya where the export controls were applied as a political-type control.
The General Accounting Office investigated the situation, and found that
all that resulted was a change in suppliers; in other words, Libya got the
same goods but they got them from different suppliers, probably from
Italy or from Germany, countries with which they had relationships.
I am going to ask John Ellicott, should there be these political controls, considering our competitive situation in terms of our exporters being perceived as uncertain suppliers? Should there be any political
controls at all in this area, where we are not followed by any allies or
friends and, if so, are there any ways of limiting them on a compromise
basis or should we try to wipe them out entirely? This is a broad question, but I would like to get your thinking on it, John.
ANSWER, Mr. Ellicott: The only control at this time that I know
has ever been claimed to be effective was the one we imposed on Uganda.
It was little known, Idi Amin fell within two months and it had nothing
to do with the control. Yet, it really looked good. The best thing you
can say about the political trade controls is that they appease or ward off
possible military intervention. I mean, there are worse things than export controls that the United States can be going around doing. If we
have to go through some kind of a trade control on Nicaragua rather
than sending U.S. troops to Nicaragua, I think it is better to do the former than the latter, but that hardly justifies the controls. I am afraid it is
a very bad habit that we have fallen into; it is not effective and, yet, we
keep doing it. As far as I can tell, we are going to keep on doing it. We
may do it with Panama, we are almost certain to do it to a greater degree
with South Africa. I do not know how to get rid of political trade controls in the kind of political system we have.
QUESTION, Professor King: I want John Fried to comment on
this, too. It seems to me that you are punishing the U.S. exporter for
something that somebody else has done. The victim is the exporter here
rather than the country which is the target. John Fried, how does Canada avoid it?
ANSWER, Mr. Fried: We do not avoid it, mostly because we admit
we do not have any effect except with a smaller export or smaller share of
foreign markets. It is important to remember that from time to time,
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democratic values of one sort or another survive simply by virtue of export controls.
For example, when a regime cannot be brought around to cooperative ventures like police training or education, which reflect the values of
a democratic society, and who is a gross and persistent violater of human
rights, the U.S. population may not want the Government to do business
with them. Similarly, Canada will not sell even low technology military
equipment to those kinds of areas. Brazil and France and other states
will gladly fill the void.
Canada does not want to be seen as an accessory in those kinds of
things. That is a foreign policy reason, a political reason, but it reflects
the general will of the Government and the society that it represents.
QUESTION, Professor King: One of the questions that does come
up in connection with COCOM is the question of a divergence of opinion. For example, in terms of the Soviet Union and its allies, it is highly
conceivable to me there might be divergency among the members of
COCOM on the impact of certain technology, in terms of the receipt of
that technology.
How do you settle a dispute? Do you settle a dispute in terms of
these divergencies which certainly have existed in practice, or in terms of
policies that were applied in the past?
ANSWER, Mr. Ellicott: Sometimes I think there are more divergencies in the United States than there are within COCOM. Certainly
we have very strong different views between the Defense Department and
some other departments about what is critical and what should be
controlled.
Within COCOM, they are worked out. The system has worked reasonably well. Everybody has a say. There is a complaint in the United
States that you hear nothing in COCOM on the military side of the picture because the U.S. industry has no representation in COCOM. Some
of the other countries in COMCO permit a degree of industry participation of COCOM. In the United States we do not. Some people in industry feel, as a result, that some decisions were made that if they had been
thought about by people who knew more about the product and technology, it might have been different. COCOM works it out pretty well.
COMMENT, Mr. Fried: The main debate is mainly over civilian
technology, with both sides in the United States. There is an emerging
consensus that there should be deregulation of some civilian technology
that does not have military application. There was a period in the first
Reagan administration where everything was thought have military application. For example, if you strung enough digital watches together
you could get an adequate computer out of them. But there is also a
consensus today that east-west trade and west-west trade need not have
the same formality.
COMMENT, Mr. Ellicott: There was a period three years ago when

Ellicott and Fried-DISCUSSION

the Pentagon felt that they would lose the battle of controlling personal
computers. So they went to a friendly congressional committee and they
brought in a bunch of computers and played war games. At least personal computers have been decontrolled and taken out of COCOM
control.
COMMENT, Mr. Donohue: I think both of the speakers also raised
a couple of questions. One of them was a remark that Jonathan Fried
made with regards to the end result. There may be some inconsistencies
between the U.S. principle that is contained in some of our export laws
and the FrA. I am thinking of some of the laws that we have in the
financial control area, where certain types of payments cannot be made
to certain nationals. I believe Cuba is on the Treasury list where no monetary payment can be paid to Cubans; however, in the FTA we are expanding in the area of financial services whereby U.S. banks will be able
to have a considerable market in Canada and vice versa.
COMMENT, Mr. Fried: A country, simply by reason of a company's nationality, ownership or control, will allege jurisdiction over a
good or product. Also, every country in the world exercises control of
currency. I am really talking about a corporation, a subsidiary, let us
say, which is incorporated as a Canadian entity, in Canada, exercising
the right of establishment in the FTA, producing a Canadian good. Canadian directors, and the Canadian corporations are subject to the laws
of Canada by virtue of that corporation's Canadian production, Canadian goods, Canadian technology. There is no connection with the
United States except it has U.S. ownership or control.
Now, it may well be that the U.S. parent company may be subject to
U.S. controls, but is there any rationale or justification for the fact that
the Canadian company, in regards to its export of a Canadian product,
should be subject to a U.S. control which may conflict with Canadian
foreign policy objectives? The answer is no.
COMMENT, Mr. Ellicott: That is my answer too. You do face
problems with the double administrative procedures and having to obtain
a license which is really superfluous because of re-export or simply by
virtue of the fact that the product, in the Canadian law as well as in the
U.S. law is subject to control. It is in the foreign policy area where we
begin to differ, such as regarding Cuba or Nicaragua.
Since you are talking about nonmilitary COCOM, and non-U.S. origin components, corporate nationality is itself an issue. The Americans
have asked the Government to allow all U.S. investment, but once you
have allowed all U.S. investment, it will be treated exactly as Canadian
investment.
QUESTION, Mr. Kirby: As I understand it, in the FTA section
related to financial aspects, both sides opted for national treatment for
the banking industry issue. Therefore, it is explicit that whatever the
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Canadians do with respect to banking, they are entitled to do the same as
we are.
Am I not correct that is the way the agreement came down on banking, we did opt for national treatment?
ANSWER, Mr. Fried: I guess the final buzz words agreed upon was
"equivalence of competitive opportunities," which is closer to national
treatment than reciprocity. Any foreign firm coming into Canada shall
operate a local subsidiary by virtue of branch operation in order to ensure that the subsidiary is indeed Canadian incorporated and subject to
Canadian incorporate regulation. That, however, is still distinguished
from central bank control over currency. There are intergovernmental
arrangements, well outside of the FTA, among central banks that allocate jurisdiction over banking supervision and home country regulators
so as to ensure solvency of the bank as a headquartered institution in the
whole country. The FTA does not go near that side of the banking
regulation.
QUESTION, Professor King: Before the United States imposes
political export controls, say on Panama, is there any free advice to
Canada?
ANSWER, Mr. Fried: We do talk all the time. We share an open
border and are both exporters, and our licensers are in touch on almost a
daily basis. I think, as John Ellicott indicated, the United States really
learned its lesson in the Siberian pipeline incident. There was at least
advanced notification, if not consultations, prior to the imposition of controls on Libya and Nicaragua, and one would expect the same should the
United States move in that direction on Panama.
COMMENT, Professor King: I want to thank you for a wonderful
session. Both of you deserve a round of applause.

